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NATO, Russia and European Security After the Cold War
Summary
Only in response to political,  resp. moral,  pressure, NATO has eventually decided  to open its 
ranks to new applicants for membership. For the East Central  European countries, joining the 
Atlantic alliance is crucial for a number of historical and geopolitical reasons. It is only on the 
basis of NATO membership that they feel stabilisation of their region to be possible. Long-term 
fear of Russia plays but a  secondary role.  Traditional  fear of German power continues to be 
latent,  but  as  long  as  the  Germans  operate  within  an  Atlantic  framework,  such  concern  is 
efficiently overcome. A system of collective security – which is sometimes seen as a possible or 
even as a  desirable  alternative  to the  alliance  model  represented  by NATO  – is structurally 
capable of providing but a mere semblance of European security.
The Background of NATO Enlargement
In the controversies about NATO enlargement, one fundamental fact is frequently ignored: that the 
problem was put on the political agenda not because of NATO's expansionist ambitions but as a result 
of urgent requests from countries wanting to join the alliance.  For a long while, NATO responded 
reluctantly  and  even defensively  – not  the  least  because any enlargement  of alliance  territory is 
bound to entail an enlargement of alliance commitments. In the perspective shared by most allies, an 
optimum number of members is already there; an addition of new members appears to add greater 
inflexibility. Therefore, many feel that enlargement is unlikely to create more security. Despite of all 
this,  NATO came  under  ever  more  intensive  political  and  moral  pressure:  There  were  countries 
believing they belonged to the West and aspiring to be with the West which felt not welcomed but 
rebuffed  – something which NATO was hardly able  to justify in the  long run. The driving force 
behind the development towards enlargement of alliance territory was therefore not NATO, but the 
membership  applicants  insisting  that  NATO  opened  the  door  for  them.  Accordingly,  it  seems 
appropriate to speak not of enlarging but opening NATO.
Why are the countries of Eastern and Central Europe so much interested in joining NATO? There are 
first of all two reasons. One of them is the fact that NATO is the only functioning security system in 
Europe today.  In this day and age with prevailing uncertainties and instabilities,  such an alliance 
represents a  stability factor  of high value indeed.  The  other reason lies in East  Central  Europe's 
geopolitical condition and historic experience. Before World War I, the region did not exist in terms 
of statehood, since it was divided between three empires: Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary.
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Only the  demise  of these three  empires after  their  defeat  in 1918  gave rise to  Central  and  East 
European countries as states of their own. However, when two decades later two of the former great 
powers in the form of Nazi-Germany and Soviet Union became strong again and concluded a pact 
with each other,  the Central  and East Europeans lost their  independence  once again.  At first, the 
region was divided between the two empires, then conquered in total by Hitler's armies only to be 
taken  over  not  long  afterwards  by Stalin's  troops and  to  be  added  to  the  "internal",  respective 
"external", parts of the Soviet empire. And there they stayed for the next four and a half decades. 
Only after the collapse of the Moscow empire were these countries between the Baltic Sea and the 
Balkan peninsula given back their independence. And this independence, so their strongly manifested 
will, should never again be taken away from them.
It would be a mistake to believe that these countries' only or primary motive is their fear of Russia. It 
is true that the most recent and longest experience of suppression was made with the Russian side in 
the form of the now dissolved Soviet Union. And it appears as if a large part of the Russian elite 
today wants to restore in one way or another the former USSR. But the Central and East Europeans' 
feeling of not being safe enough in the long term, is related to many other aspects as for instance 
internal,  intraregional and economic conditions. In other words: it is related to the state of general 
stability of East Central Europe. The peoples in the region hope to strengthen this stability decisively 
by finding support in the West. The problem has crucial aspects which are of an internal nature. 
Germany and Russia in East Central European Perception
But even to the extent that external factors are under consideration, Russia is not the only matter of 
concern. Essentially, Germany is viewed as a possible danger as well. The fact that the East Central  
Europeans currently tend not to be much focussed on the German challenge,  results from German 
NATO membership which makes Germany a country securely integrated into the West and thus inca-
pable of imperialistic ambitions. Thus Germany's weight which has increased through reunification, 
appears not as a possible threat but as a source of reliable assistance. It is not only economic help and 
technical know-how that the East Central Europeans are seeking. More than anything else, Germany 
is seen to be necessary as a bridge, rather than as a barrier (as it was in previous times), to the West. 
In contrast to the interwar period, East Central Europe now possesses a landlink to the West on the 
basis of Germany's belonging to both NATO and the EU. This is one of the crucial benefits that the 
East Central Europeans want to secure for the future. Their own adherence to NATO, is one of their 
means to this end. 
The  new situation  has been  deliberately  created.  The  democratic  forces that,  in  the  late  1980s, 
initiated  political  transformation in East Central Europe sought, inter alia,  German reunification in 
order to eliminate the GDR as a barrier which prevented adjacency with the West. For this reason, 
both the  Solidarnoœæ opposition in Poland  and  the  reform group at  the  helm the Hungarian CP 
supported the Federal Republic in matters of the German problem. This policy has been successful: 
The GDR which had been a continuous obstacle to contact with the West has been removed; there is 
a united Germany which is firmly anchored in the West and is a stable link to NATO. As Germany 
does provide rather than prohibit  access to the West,  the East Central  European countries are not 
threatened any longer by geopolitical isolation  – a crucial factor of their disaster in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s. In East Central European opinion, the current favourable geopolitical situation has 
to be made use of so as to ensure Western support on a long-term basis. It is membership in NATO 
which is seen to be crucially important as the principal, permanent, and solid link that will guarantee 
security for the future.
This longing for security is fuelled by a number of factors and developments outside the region. There 
are statements from "national-patriotic" circles in Moscow that express revisionist tendencies and pro-
claim  a  need  for  another  imperial  expansion  and  domination.  There  are  attempts  by  Russian 
politicians to reconquer lost  positions and  regain the  influence  they believe  adequate  for a  great 
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power by making use of economic or other pressures or even military force. In particular, the war in 
Chechnya gave rise to grave concerns in both East Central Europe and beyond. An increasing need is 
felt  to prevent future "Russian uncertainties" by an association with the West as close as possible. 
Ukraine which had originally opted for neutrality is by now interested in co-operation with NATO in 
the closest possible way as long as membership is out of the question. Even in such a traditionally 
Russophile country as Bulgaria there are considerations on closer links to the Atlantic alliance.
Reasons for Western Willingness to Accept New Members
Why has NATO eventually responded positively to the demands of the applicant countries? On the 
one hand, there is the above mentioned feeling one should not to rebuff sympathising countries or else 
turn them into adversaries. Countries that are willing to follow Western standards of democracy, rule 
of law, market  economy and human rights should be protected against risks of internal or external 
instability. At the same time, admission into an international association where the members mutually 
agree  to  respect  these  principles  and  simultaneously  renounce  revisionist  claims,  is  seen  as  an 
important stabilising factor for both the transforming countries and Europe as a whole. 
Also,  Western  governments  know  from  their  own  historic  experience  the  positive  effects  of 
integrating states which have to cope with internal and/or external challenges. The model is provided 
by the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. After World War II, the country was faced with 
much greater challenges than had been the Reich after 1918. But, in contrast to the Weimar Republic 
of the late 1920s and early 1930s, it  was able to follow the path of democracy and stability.  The 
difference explaining why the latter had failed and the Federal Republic managed to succeed, was 
that  in 1945  the  victorious powers had  learned  their  lesson from previous disaster.  They did  not 
isolate the Germans again but integrated them into the Western community of states. The opportunity 
of  integration  offered  to  West  Germans after  the  war should  now also be  open  to  East  Central 
Europeans.
The Russian Problem
In Western capitals,  it  is emphasised that  Russia must not be alienated  by the process of opening 
NATO. While this country with its vast Eurasian territories greatly transcends the Atlantic framework 
underlying NATO, a rift between the two sides should be avoided. That is, while there is no question 
to invite  Russia into NATO (whose large range of obligations Moscow is definitely  unwilling to 
shoulder),  security  interests  shared  by either  side  can,  and  shall,  form a  basis  for  a  permanent 
relationship  of  mutual  advantage.  This  is  the  central  Western  idea  behind  the  Russia-NATO 
Founding Act. In addition, Russia is accorded guarantees to the effect that NATO is no anti-Russian 
bloc. By allowing Russians far-reaching participation in NATO matters, the Western allies hope to 
initiate  a  co-operative  relationship.  To be sure,  no one can  reasonably expect  NATO to give  an 
obligatory say to Moscow in NATO decisions. This would entail  according a right of membership 
without  corresponding obligations to  be  taken.  The  existing arrangement  implies that  NATO has 
already paid a high price – in the eyes of some critics even too high a price. Now, Russia can voice 
its opinion on every question, one of the consequences being that decision making processes within 
NATO will be made more difficult and slowed down by additional consultations. 
Underlying is the Western hope that good will and active effort will eventually pay, if perhaps only in 
the longer run. On the Russian side, the Founding Act is often seen in a quite a different light: as a 
means to prevent as much evil from NATO as possible. Underlying is the feeling that one needs to 
protect oneself from the Atlantic challenge and to rein in Western "expansion" to the East. Since, in 
this view, the evil of both NATO enlargement and, even less, NATO existence cannot be prevented,  
all effort will have to be concentrated on hindering Atlantic activities as much as possible. Far from 
appreciating NATO as a security partner, the proponents of this school of thought see it as a security 
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opponent that has to be impaired to the maximum extent possible. Thus there is a clear danger that 
the West's effort to reach conciliation with Moscow, will not to be honoured and, in addition to that,  
even be exploited against NATO.
If this standpoint should prevail in Moscow, this would make negative impact not only on Western-
Russian relations. It will also be harmful to Russia domestically. The NATO members' willingness to 
have  the  country integrated  into  an  all-European  consensus and  framework,  is  in  many respects 
crucial for its development. Not only does Russia depend on Western cooperation with regard to a 
great  number of economic,  technological,  and ecological  problems. It also needs a quiet  and safe 
political neighbourhood so as to be able to concentrate on changing and rebuilding the very domestic 
structures necessary for future development. If Moscow would choose to ignore this need for the sake 
of dreaming back into past grandeur and seeking its restoration, such policy direction could not but 
entail  most harmful consequences. Such a course of action would also amount to repetition of past 
failure, i.e. to the very phenomenon which Karl Marx denounced as a mere farce. After all, both the 
Czars'  Empire  and  the  Soviet  Union  perished  when,  for  the  sake  of  external  ambition  and/or 
antagonistic relations with the outside,  they took burdens which were beyond internal,  particularly 
economic,  capacity.  Given Russia's greatly diminished potential  in the  1990s,  the  costs of power 
politics vis-a-vis the outside world would inevitably produce disaster within a very short period of 
time. A modes glimpse of what would have to be expected in this event, has already been provided by 
the Chechnya debacle. 
The Proposal of Collective Security in Europe
The end of East-West confrontation has given rise to the idea  that  NATO which was founded to 
counter the erstwhile Soviet threat, might be discontinued after this mission has become outdated. As 
a more timely substitute to NATO, a system of collective  security has been advocated.  However, 
NATO's sixteen nations have decided  to stay together.  What  they deem necessary is to adapt  the 
alliance to new conditions. The East Central  European applicants for membership concur with this 
view:  Their  hopes for  security  in  Europe  rest  with NATO.  Such wide-spread  acceptance  of the 
Western alliance is not by coincidence. What the well-meaning proponents of the collective security 
idea fail to recognize, is that its implementation would practically result in collective insecurity for 
Europe.  All  systems which have been devised to create  collective  security,  have not fulfilled  the 
promise. 
A case in point is the League of Nations after World War I which was incapable to prevent, let alone 
counter, military aggression. This became clear even before Hitler's "big aggression" started. In the 
mid-1930s,  the League of Nations supported by Britain, France,  the USSR, and other powers was 
willing but unable to stop a minor country, fascist Italy, from conquering and colonizing Abessinia 
even though the aggressor was totally dependent on oil shipment from abroad which might have been 
cut easily with no use of force. But decision-making under a system of collective security is such that 
even a "cheap" decision of this kind was impossible in the defense of peace. Abessinia provided a test 
case to Hitler which crucially shaped his assessment of his opponents: They were but paper tigers who 
could be expected to have no teeth when open conflict would break out. Accordingly, international 
reliance on a system of collective security was essential for World War II to break out. It would be an 
incredible failure both of practical common sense and intellectual capacity to neglect this lesson of 
history and to repeat a previous error for which European countries, not in the least Russia, have paid 
an enormous price.
The details of why a system of collective security is in fact a system of collective insecurity, can be 
easily explained. The rationale the advocates count on, is the mutual pledge taken by an unlimited 
number of participants that they will be willing to support any one among them who might become 
the target of aggression. In theory, this is marvellous: Any possible aggressor is promised that he will 
have all  the  other  members of the  system against  him.  Therefore,  he  appears to be in  a  state  of 
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hopeless inferiority from the very beginning. In practice, however, things are quite different. First of 
all,  the very fact that a system of collective security indiscriminately depends on any country of a 
given geographical area eliminates the basis for common action at the very moment when security is 
crucially at stake. For if there is no common focus on security, no such security can be expected to 
result. Since every country will assess the challenge to security by standards of its own and act on that 
basis. It would be tantamount to an outright miracle if lack of commonality would somehow transform 
into common action under conditions of duress and danger. Miracles rarely happen in international 
politics.
This may seem to  suggest  the  conclusion that  countries  which,  when the  chips are  down,  prove 
unwilling to support the victim of aggression, have to be seen as reneging their promise under the 
system of collective security.  But  this would be misleading.  Actually no country which avoids to 
support a victim of aggression, or else even joins the aggressor, has ever had to revoke a pledge 
previously made  since it  has in fact  has never made  a concrete  promise. For whenever a pact  on 
collective  security is concluded,  the  situation of possible  aggression is not  envisaged  in concrete 
terms. It therefore remains undefined. Such vagueness entails fatal consequences for any prospective 
victim of aggression. When he becomes the target of attack,  there is no common definition of the 
situation which has resulted. Any member of the system defines the situation on his own and, on this 
basis, decides independently which side is the victim of aggression and which one the aggressor and 
also what  kind  of  support  is  appropriate.  In fact  a  member  can  even  conclude  that  there  is  no 
aggression at all. But he is equally free to say that the victim of aggression is the aggressor and vice 
versa – and can then act accordingly.
Under such circumstances, it  is justified  to say that  a system that  claims to provide for collective 
security,  actually  posits no concrete  obligations to  support a  victim of aggression and,  therefore, 
creates a mere semblance of collective security. International security, however, is too important to 
allow its being undermined by an empty promise. It is for this reason that the Western countries have 
chosen to preserve NATO after the Cold War has ended.  There is no security substitute to NATO. 
European security would be put in jeopardy if NATO were replaced by a system of collective security 
which  in  fact  promises  collective  insecurity.  What  is  needed  is  to  adapt  NATO  as  the  only 
functioning European security system to changed requirements.  That's what the Atlantic  allies are 
striving at. What they seek is to open NATO for those countries that both want to become members 
and share NATO's basic interests. It is only on this basis that the common purpose can be maintained 
which will allow common action when peace and security are at stake.
As far as the current situation is concerned, the conflict in Bosnia has given a number of insights. As 
long as the Europeans have tried to cope with the problems, there was some effort but certainly no re-
sult. The reason is that neither the OSCE nor the EU were capable of providing a framework for com-
mon action. It was only when NATO took responsibility that the warring parties were eventually in-
duced to discontinue their internecine armed confrontation. The Atlantic Alliance in which both the 
present and the prospective new members of the share a common understanding of the situation and 
the  resulting  requirements,  became  the  focus  for  the  very  common  action  which  had  proved 
impossible  in  any other  context.  At  the  same time,  Russia  has demonstrated  both in Bosnia  and 
elsewhere that it has partially divergent interests. This is natural given the country's grossly divergent 
background. But this fact  shows that there are limits to commonality which are likely to preclude 
consensus on efficient support to victims of aggression. It would jeopardize European security if this 
difference  in security interest were ignored.  What  is necessary,  is to capitalize  on those common 
security  interests  which  do  exist  and  to  provide  for  an  agreement  to  disagree  whenever  such 
commonality is lacking. This is precisely the purpose of the NATO-Russia Founding Act  and the 
resulting mechanism of coordinating mutual  security efforts. The Founding Act  bears evidence  to 
Western  willingness to  provide  for  maximum cooperation  and  consensus between  the  two sides, 
partial differences in security interest notwithstanding.
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